Moshe Sharett (1894-1965) worked for the Jewish Agency's political department and was Israel's second prime minister (1954-1955). Reuven Shiloah (1909-1959) was also a member of Jewish Agency's political department and was the first director of Mossad (1949-53).
A long and detailed interview held in Jerusalem. Sharett describes his first encounter with Wingate "I was very impressed by his appearance, and his deep-set eyes and suppressed passion struck me right from the start." He met Wingate and his wife, and noted their contrasts. Some Jews believed Wingate was a spy. Sharett felt Wingate's intense Zionism from the beginning and he could not account for it. Special Night Squads were Wingate's idea and he began setting them up before he got official approval. S
Shiloah describes his initial meeting with Wingate. Wingate very security conscious, believed his office was bugged and conducted interviews in his car. Persuaded senior officers that SNS was needed to combat smuggling. He went with Wingate and Sasson to Damascus, where they infiltrated Arab smuggling gangs. He stresses Haganah were fully involved with the SNS, in effect becoming temporary members of the British Army. Wingate always made up numbers of his squads by seeking out Jewish volunteers. Wingate was very much at the centre of operations, SNS used deception techniques, raids usually began after midnight, and always attacked on at least two fronts to put the enemy under cross-fire. These raids much more successful than previous British efforts which flooded an area with soldiers during daylight and with no element of surprise. Arabs were always aware of these raids, and guerillas would simply disappear.
Shiloah and Sharett give opinions of leading figures: John Dill was "decent" but anti-Semitic [Dill was GOC, Palestine in 1936-7]. Archibald Wavell was not an anti-Zionist at the time but became so later and was not anti-Semitic [Wavell was GOC, Palestine, 1937-8 , and headed Middle East Command 1939-41].
Sharett considered most anti-Semitic officer was the C in C in Cairo [pres. GOC, Egypt; this could be Sir Robert Gordon-Finlayson, 1938-9, or Sir Henry Wilson, GOC, 1939-41]. Notes [Bernard] Paget and [Henry Maitland] Wilson [both headed Middle East Command] were particularly anti-Semitic, but [George] Giffard [briefly GOC, Palestine] and Claude Auchinleck were not. Claims Wavell was too much influenced by "oriental experts". He recalls Wingate's stormy meetings in 1938 with Lord Beaverbrook and Leslie Hore-Belisha (secretary of state for war), who Wingate disliked because he was not a Zionist. Tony Simmonds [later ADC to Claude Auchinleck] was one of the few sympathetic younger officers.
Recalls that Arthur Wauchope (British High Commissioner, Palestine, 1931-38) sent Sharett a message after his departure for Britain commending the defence of Tirath Zvi. Sharett says he was concerned that Egypt would fall to the Axis, spoke to "Cheffert" and "Magnes" (British army officers, not identified) about getting weapons for Jewish settlers, but without success. Wavell in Cairo was sympathetic but not encouraging, Wingate's return to Britain where he saw Leslie Hore-Belisha (secretary of state for war) and Lord Beaverbrook, argued with Beaverbrook. After attending a World Zionist Congress in Geneva in 1939, Sharett went to London where offered to set up a Jewish legion to assist the British war effort, had meetings with General Pownall and Ironside (CIGS), but this came to nothing.
Discusses "Clayton" who was a Zionist, although his brother who worked for Wavell (pres. Illytd Clayton) was not. Shiloah thought all senior Army officers save Wavell and Ritchie, his ADC, disliked Wingate, because of his talent, insubordination and liking for backroom dealings. He mentions an officer "Norton", at Palestine HQ who particularly disliked Wingate. Junior officer Tony Simmonds liked Wingate but was "a very shallow person"; NCOs and privates were more often sympathetic to him. He recounts an incident when Wingate refused to meet Sir William Batterhill, the chief secretary of Palestine 1937-9, who was being entertained by David Hacohen, and Wingate accused Hacohen of associating with the Jews' enemies. Disagreements between Shiloah and Wingate over proposed Jewish pioneer units, which Wingate opposed, but which eventually led to Jewish soldiers getting good experience.
Shiloah says Clayton [this is Sir Illtyd Clayton, 1886-1955, soldier and diplomat] the director of military intelligence at Middle East HQ was pro-Arab but liked Wingate and got Wingate his posting in Abyssinia. Wingate had wanted to take Jewish volunteers to Abyssinia but was stymied by Norton, with only Akavia joining him. Wingate had a plan for the North African campaign involving massed transport, which involved Jewish transport units, but this came to nothing. Considers that Wingate"believed to the very end that he was destined to play a definite part in Jewish history".
Sharett met Wingate in Cairo before El Alamein, Wingate believed Rommel would take Egypt but had a plan to stop him in Palestine. Said if Palestine was attacked he would return, with or without permission. The SNS were finally cancelled because need for them had largely gone, as settlement defence had improved. Night fighting experience proved very useful to Israeli forces in war of 1948-9. Says a training programme was also organised for Jewish resistance should Palestine fall, organised by General B T Wilson [not identified], who had a low opinion of Macmichael, the High commissioner and General Henry Maitland Wilson, the then GOC Palestine. He also mentions on Tegart's Wall, a barrier which covered parts of the northern border, which never worked.