The manuscript appears to be a lightly-sketched memoir of the Chindit campaign. It does not appear to have developed into a full-scale study. It comprises three sections: 1) a typescript headed "Introduction" which was probably written in the latter part of the 1950s; 2) a holograph section written in pencil at the same or a later period; 3) a holograph section rotten in ink, written 24/25 August 1974 (f.21), written just before Dunlop gave his papers to the Library.
It is probable that the content of the manuscript had some relationship to information earlier supplied to the Cabinet Office Historical Section in 1951 (DOW/2). There are indications that the manuscript was compiled around the time that the second volume of the official history, The war against Japan, which dealt with Operation Longcloth, was published (1958). Marginalia in the holograph sections indicate it was written in "about 1957".
The typescript section, entitled "Introduction" indicates that Dunlop was planning to write a memoir. He describes his relations with and opinions of Wingate, noting "his utter ruthlessness when occasion demanded". He knew Wingate well in 1942 during early stages of planning the Chindit operations, when he was a brigade intelligence officer. He describes in some detail his training with Column 1, which was his first real command. Column 1 was based on the 3rd Battalion, 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles. Dunlop notes Wingate's insensitivity to Gurkha religious ceremonies, when he refused to cancel training for Desera [Dasara - Hindi religious festival] .
This is followed by a section written in pencil entitled "They looked behind them", prefaced with Wingate's last message to Column 1. Dunlop describes his training in Bush Warfare School, the arrival of Wingate in India to coordinate irregular forces in Burma, the training of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade (nucleus of the original Chindit force), preparations during summer 1942, Dunlop appointed brigade intelligence officer, and later his appointment to lead Column 1. Dunlop explains command under Wingate meant a combination of "implicit obedience and almost complete independence", and that "he judged by the results, not by the methods employed in attaining them".
In the 1974 addition, Dunlop discusses preparations for the first Chindit campaign links with RAF and signals work. Move to the Imphal area; Wingate's verbal order to Dunlop to attack the railway across the Irrawaddy (i.e. the Mandalay-Lashio line), and raise a rebellion around Maymut [Mongmit?]; state of roads in Burma improved by Japanese, which they did not know about and gave the Japanese more mobility; "Maymut" rebellion idea flawed because of Wingate's misunderstanding that the people there were Kachins (who were pro-Allied).